In this paper we present a model of the interplay between
learning, incentives and the allocation of decision rights
in the context of a generalized agency problem. Within
this context, not only actors face conflicting interests
but diverging cognitive ``visions'' of the right course of
action as well. We show that a principal may obtain the
implementation of desired organizational policies by means
of appropriate incentives or by means of appropriate
design of the allocation of decisions, when the latter is
cheaper but more complex. We also show that when the
principal is uncertain about which course of action is
more appropriate and wants to learn it from the
environment, organizational structure and incentives
interact in non-trivial ways and must be carefully tuned.
When learning is not at stake, incentives and
organizational structure are substitutes. When instead
learning is at stake, organizational structure and
incentives may complement each other and have to be fine
tuned according to the complexity of the learning process
and the competitive pressure which is put on fast or slow
learning.